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Abstract   The article addresses the induced cost, the premium, from establish-
ing a marine protected area in a deterministic model of a fishery. Outside the
protected area, the fishery is managed optimally through total allowable catch
quotas. The premium is found to be increasing and convex along the protection
parameter. Biological measures are introduced to increase the understanding of
the mechanisms in the bioeconomic system. Time-series solutions show that the
net return per unit of fish increases after the protected area is established.
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Introduction
A no-take marine protected area (MPA) is a geographically defined area, covering
parts of a fish stock’s habitat that is closed to fishing (Hannesson 1998). The main
issue in this article is how the formation of an MPA causes changes in the value of a
fishery. In particular, we relate the size of the MPA to the value of the fishery, focus-
ing on the change in value as the protected area size changes. The area size is
treated as exogenous in the model. We are thus not interested in ‘the optimal size’ of
the MPA. We are rather investigating the implications of MPAs to economic and, to
a certain extent, biological measures.
As evident in the literature, the use of MPAs introduces a range of potential
benefits, and the implementations are well motivated. MPAs may produce benefits
in numerous ways and in many different aspects. The value of a fishery, however, is
one of the few things that may suffer (i.e., decrease) from the establishment of ma-
rine reserves. It is thus both appropriate and meaningful to analyze this separately,
as we do here.
The model is deterministic, and we introduce perfect enforcement of the optimal
harvest rate. It turns out that any degree of protection; that is, any fraction of the
habitat under protection, reduces the equilibrium value of the fishery. Both
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Hannesson (1998) and Holland and Brazee (1996) arrive at the same conclusion, al-
though under slightly different assumptions. This is expected, as the protection acts
as a limitation in the exercise of the optimal management of the fishery. Accord-
ingly, we are not interested in the protection decision as such. Rather, we assert that
the decision to protect habitat results from some political process or is based on con-
siderations separate from those addressed in this article. We emphasize that this is
both realistic and relevant, particularly due to the poor success of traditionally man-
aged fisheries. Further, changes in the protection policy may result from changes in
the political landscape and, intriguingly, for reasons far removed from resource
management issues.
Marine protected areas are by many held to produce different benefits (not as-
sessed in this investigation) and reduce risks. It is in the risk perspective we invoke
the term ‘premium.’ We review some of the extensive literature on these issues,
MPAs in general, and clarify our perspectives. First, we assert that for protected ar-
eas to be of any interest in a socioeconomic perspective, these benefits and the value
of reduced risk should be compared to the reductions in value of the fishery. The re-
ductions are indicated in this article. As the model is deterministic, the uncertainty
involved in fisheries management may well dilute our results. However, the deter-
ministic solution provides the first-order approximation to the stochastic problem.
For small levels of uncertainty, the deterministic solution and, in particular, our so-
lution, is relevant. For high levels of uncertainty, the benefits of an MPA should
equal the levels of reduction in value.
The interest in marine protected areas (or marine reserves; marine sanctuaries)
has been increasing over the last 15 years, among both scholars and managers. The
literature addressing different aspects of MPAs is extensive. Regarding biological is-
sues, the literature presents many good reasons to consider MPAs as a management
tool for fish stocks. Reserves can reduce the variance of a population (Conrad 1999)
and catches (Hannesson 2002); raise the spawning and exploited biomass level (Gell
and Roberts 2003; Guénette and Pitcher 1999); and improve recruitment (Guénette
and Pitcher 1999), density, and diversity (Halpern 2003; Sanchirico 2000). Further,
MPAs can protect against extinction (Flaaten and Mjølhus 2005) and management
failure (Lauck et al. 1998). “[…] nearly any marine habitat can benefit from the
implementation of a reserve” Halpern (2003, p. 117). When it comes to the eco-
nomic aspects, the literature is less conclusive. Hannesson (1998) demonstrates that
reserves cannot yield economic benefits in a deterministic model, and compared to
pure total allowable catch (TAC) policies, reserves reduce efficiency (Anderson
2002). However, Sanchirico and Wilen (1998) demonstrate that under certain condi-
tions marine reserves represent an economic benefit to the system and improve
overall harvest levels. An enlightening review targeting policy implications is
Grafton, Kompass, and Schneider (2005). Further, Sanchirico (2000) provides a
thorough discussion of potential costs and benefits arising from MPAs and asserts
that reserves can increase nonconsumptive use values and control fishing effort.
Hastings and Botsford (1999) find equivalence in yield from reserves and traditional
management, however, in the sink-source case. Nonetheless, there is a wide consen-
sus in the literature that MPAs need to be combined with other management tools to
provide positive results (e.g., Apostolaki et al. 2002; Flaaten and Mjølhus 2005;
Grafton, Kompass, and Schneider 2005; Sanchirico 2000; and Sumaila 2001). We
agree with this view and think it is important to study the interplay between a pro-
tected area and other management regimes. In this article, we combine an MPA with
a TAC policy enforced on the remaining grounds; i.e., grounds open to fishing.
Uncertainty is an important issue in the literature on MPAs, and in many cases it
is the main motivation behind the promotion of marine reserves. Reserves are held
to reduce the risk from poor stock assessment and collapse (Arnason 2001; Lauck etThe Premium of Marine Protected Areas 173
al. 1998; Sanchirico 2000), uncontrollability, and economic shortsightedness (Clark
1996), inter alia. In particular, MPAs address “persistent, irreducible (our emphasis)
scientific uncertainty pertaining to marine ecosystems” (Lauck et al. 1998, p. 72).
Further, terms like ‘insurance value’ (Grafton, Kompass, and Schneider 2005;
Sumaila 2001) and ‘bet hedging’ (Lauck 1996; Sanchirico 2000) are frequently in
use in relation to MPAs. “Bet hedging is usually thought to involve a cost, or ‘pre-
mium,’ in terms of a decrease in expected benefits, which is accepted in order to
achieve a reduction in risk” (Lauck et al. 1998, pp.74–5). This is our perspective on
marine protected areas. They reduce the value of the fishery, and the reduction is
comprehended as a premium. As already mentioned, different types of other benefits
(not directly related to reduced risk), may result from the implementation of MPAs.
While we do not address any of these benefits, we do produce a numeric valuation
of the premium. We implement the optimal harvesting strategy; i.e., maximizing the
pecuniary value of the fishery, in all cases in this article.1 Thus, we provide a lower
benchmark for the premium of marine reserves. Note that even though our model
does not explicitly account for uncertainty, both MPAs and the feedback type of har-
vest policy deal with uncertainty in different ways. We will discuss this in detail.
Many authors try to assess the intrinsic value or economic performance of
MPAs. Hannesson (1998), Holland and Brazee (1996), Sanchirico and Wilen (1998),
and Sumaila (2001) are some. Among these, our model is closely related to that of
Hannesson (1998). However, Hannesson (1998) regards the equilibrium solution un-
der open-access in the unprotected area and compares it to open-access and optimal
harvesting in the entire area. Further, his diffusion process is slightly different than
ours. Our model is dynamic, and we always implement the optimal strategy. Holland
and Brazee (1996) present a dynamic model. The biological submodel is different
from ours. Further, they discuss different effort levels in the fishery. They imple-
ment a fixed unit price of fish; we invoke a demand curve. Sanchirico and Wilen
(1998) also consider different biological structures from us and, as Hannesson, in-
voke rent dissipation. Also, the price is fixed in their analysis. Finally, Sumaila
(2001) relates game theoretic perspectives to recruitment failure. Notably, our work
combines the dynamic approach with the optimal harvesting strategy. Further, the
fact that the unit price of fish varies with the size of catch has implications for the
value of the fishery.
The Model
The model is an aggregated and deterministic formulation in continuous time. It is
also autonomous, which means that the involved functions are independent of time.
Let us first look at the construction of the premium.
The induced cost of implementing a marine reserve is simply the result of a re-
duction in value of the fishery. Thus, we compare the value of a fishery where an
MPA has been established to an identical fishery with no protected area. Let P de-
note the premium of the marine protected area implemented upon given initial
conditions. This is formulated as:
PX Y s









1 More specifically, we compare the value of the fishery, managed through an optimal TAC policy, with
and without the MPA present. The stocks within and outside the reserve are treated as substocks, inter-
acting through a diffusion-type migration term.Kvamsdal and Sandal 174
where X0 and Y0 are initial conditions on the stock levels out- and inside the
protected area, respectively.2 s is defined as the degree of protection and is a
number between 0 and 1; it is the proportion of the total carrying capacity un-
der protection.3 As indicated above, s is treated as a parameter in the problem.
That is, the degree of protection is not treated as a control variable; s is exog-
enous. The MPA divides the the stock into two substocks, one outside the
reserve and one under protection. These are denoted by X and Y, respectively.
Furthermore, we define V0 = V(X0, Y0; 0); the value of the fishery with no pro-
tected area. (We will stick to the following convention: superscripts relate to
the time variable, and subscripts relate to the protection parameter.) The pre-
mium is normalized according to V0. Hence, the premium is given as a share of
the total profits accruing from the fishery with no reserve present. Please note
that we are comparing steady-state values. That is, the arguments in the pre-
mium are derived from the steady state. We will use optimal control theory to
optimize the value of the fishery. Before we move on to stating the optimization
problem, a discussion of the stock dynamics is required.
The parameter s ∈ (0,1) measures the degree of protection. That is, the share s
of the entire habitat area is protected from fishing. The carrying capacity of the en-
vironment is spread uniformly throughout the habitat. It follows that s measures the
share of the carrying capacity under protection. By uniformity we attain that the
only difference between the protected and unprotected stock is the obvious differ-
ence in harvest rate. Further, the assumption of uniformity distinguishes our model
from a sink-source model of the population (cf. Sanchirico and Wilen (1998)). The
total carrying capacity is given by K. The carrying capacity within the reserve is
hence s·K, and outside the reserve it is (1 – s)·K.
Since we perform numerical calculations of the premium, the model must
be specific. Growth is assumed to be density dependent. The density of fish is
simply defined as the ratio between actual biomass and carrying capacity (i.e.,
the density outside the sanctuary is given by X/(1–s)K, where X now, of course,
measures the biomass found outside the sanctuary). It follows that the density is
0 when the stock is extinct and 1 when the biomass equals the carrying capac-
ity. For all practical purposes, the density is somewhere between 0 and 1.











where r is the intrinsic growth rate, X is the biomass, and K is the carrying capacity.
This implies that the aggregated growth will not agree with the logistic growth for
2 A more intuitively natural definition of the premium could be to let it only take one stock level argu-
ment, as the stock presumably is uniformly dispersed prior to the implementation of the MPA. However,
our formulation is more convenient as we compare steady-state values of the premium, where the den-
sity dispersion is no longer uniform. This is explained later.
3 It is convenient to think of protection in terms of the carrying capacity, which is what matters for the
outcome of the model. For practical purposes, however, it is better to refer to the geographical propor-
tion of the habitat under protection, as MPAs are, indeed, a geographical concept. Under assumptions of
uniformity, the factors comprising the carrying capacity; e.g., food and shelter, are uniformly spread
throughout the entire habitat, and these two different interpretations of protection coincide. We want to
keep both notions of MPAs in mind, as they are useful in different ways. Further, assuming uniformity
of the carrying capacity rules out the possibility of a so-called sink-source system (Sanchirico and Wilen
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the entire area whenever the densities in the subareas are different. There is one
simple reason for this; that the logistic growth law is nonlinear in the stock. In
general, one cannot add up two (or more) logistic functions to obtain a new lo-
gistic function. This results in a difference in growth for a given total biomass
for the two biological models, something that is widely ignored in the litera-
ture.4 Bischi, Lamantia, and Sbragia (2006) and Flaaten and Mjølhus (2005)
recognize and discuss the issue, however. The former paper suggests an extra
term in the growth function to correct for the difference; the latter investigates
both ideas. Notwithstanding, we find it natural to let the growth in one area de-
pend on local conditions and be independent of conditions in more remote
areas. It makes perfect sense with the patchy distribution motivation, which we
will return to.
We model the migration of fish between the areas according to Hannesson
(1998). The same idea is considered by Conrad (1999), Flaaten and Mjølhus
(2005), and Sumaila (2001), inter alios. The idea behind the migration model is
inspired by the way the natural sciences consider how substances (typically
gases) diffuse through a membrane due to differences in density, based on ran-
dom movements and the theory of probability. The net diffusion always
smoothes densities and points into the low-density area. The migration term in
















where φ is the rate of migration and determines how quickly the difference in
density will be smoothed. The limits φ→0 and φ→∞ have the following inter-
pretations. The first yields a one-dimensional problem (the protected stock is
not interesting as there is no interaction) with a reduced carrying capacity (sK ≤
K). The second yields a system with instantaneous redistribution of densities,
with total carrying capacity K; i.e., it is equivalent to the no protection scenario
(s = 0). For any positive and finite rate of migration, we have a two-dimen-
sional system; that is, two substocks interacting through migration. We always
refer to the protected habitat as one area, but extending the model to consider
several protected areas is fairly straightforward. Then, Y and sK would measure
the aggregated biomass and carrying capacity for all the protected areas. Some
assumptions regarding the migration rate would take care of the rest. The way
we have formulated the model, φ can be understood to depend on the size and
properties of the interface between the protected and unprotected areas. Keep-
ing φ fixed (as we do) implies that the properties of the interface are basically
unchanged for all s. If one thinks this construction is a bit too rigorous or not
general enough, there is another way to think of the model: think of a fish stock
with a patchy distribution, where one or more of the patches are under protec-
tion (Hannesson 2002, Sanchirico and Wilen 2002). φ would then contain
information about the distance, current conditions, and so on between the
4 The growth in our MPA model will depend on the distribution of fish between the different areas. Note
that when s = 0, our model is equivalent to a one-dimensional model with instantaneous redistribution.
In our model, redistribution between the areas is based on diffusion, and is not generally equivalent to
instantaneous redistribution. The diffusion model is expounded in the next paragraph. We believe that
the distribution does matter, and the MPA model can be comprehended as a first approximation to a spa-
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patches. These quantities would, for simplicity, be assumed to be constant.5


















































It is readily seen that the migration term adds to the stock in the low-density area,
while reducing the stock in the high-density area. Further, the migration terms can-
cel in aggregate; i.e., the migration does not change the total biomass level. Also
note that the carrying capacity is different in the two areas, according to the discus-
sion above, and that there is no harvest term in the second equation.
Now we turn to the economic aspects of the model. There are many things that
influence the economy of a fishery. We simplify and consider two issues: production
and demand. The production function has the Schaefer form:
H qEX =,
where q is the catchability coefficient, and E is effort. As before, X is the stock bio-
mass and H is the harvest rate. It simply tells us that a certain amount of effort
applied to a certain stock level yields a certain harvest. There is a constant cost per
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There is a downward sloping demand for fish; the inverse demand function has
slope –d. The price of fish is given by P(H) = p – dH, where p is the maximum price
the market is willing to pay. A higher price leads to full substitution. We are now
able to describe the net profit function:




This is the same profit function as suggested by Kugarajh, Sandal, and Berge
5 Actually, the first notion of the model; one big area divided into two smaller subareas, implies funda-
mentally different assumptions in the cases of one area (s = 0, s = 1) and of two areas [s ∈ (0,1)]. As
long as s = 0 or s = 1, there is only one area, and the fish are uniformly dispersed over the entire habitat.
Any change in the stock level at one place in the area, e.g. by harvesting activity, will, with infinite
speed, spread throughout the habitat. An instant later, the density of fish is again uniform. But whenever
s ∈ (0,1), changes in stock level will instantly redistribute in each area, but changes across the areas will
not occur faster than the migration term allows. This is why growth in the model does not compare to
the growth in the one area model, as discussed earlier. One way to avoid this problem is to motivate the
model with the notion of patchy distributions. However, this is more of a philosophical discussion, and
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(2006). The interpretation of the relationship c/pq is important. It is readily seen that
if X = c/pq, it is not possible to draw rents from the fishery. c/pq is often referred to
as the open-access solution or the bionomic equilibrium (Clark 1990), which is char-
acterized by zero profits. Further, note that profits depend on X, the biomass in the
unprotected area (i.e., where fishing activity is allowed), but not on Y, and that there
is a stock effect on costs. In our model, the stock effect represents an economic pro-
tection mechanism on the stock and implies that rational fishing activity cannot
eradicate the stock. Also, the downward sloping demand guarantees that the Hamil-
tonian, which will be introduced later, is non-linear in the harvest variable. Hence,
bang-bang type solutions are avoided.
The optimization problem may now be formulated as follows:
VX Y s Xts Hts t t
H
t ( , ;) = ( ;) , ( ;) , 00
0 max ,
∞
− ∫ [] ed δ Π (3)
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where X(t;s) and Y(t;s) is the biomass in the unprotected and protected area, respec-
tively; H(t;s) is the harvest rate; δ is the rate of discount; t is time; Π is a measure of
profit; F(·) is the natural growth in biomass as a function of biomass (where the car-
rying capacity parameter changes with the degree of protection); K is the total
carrying capacity of the environment. X0 and Y0 are the initial conditions of the bio-
masses; i.e., the biomasses at time zero.6
To make both calculations and later discussions easier, we choose to change the
scale of both variables and parameters. A consequence of this transformation is that
stocks are measured in local densities instead of biomass. Local density is the ratio
between the biomass in an area and the local carrying capacity. To avoid confusion
and more notation, we use the same symbols as before, now in lower case. The main
difference is that we talk about densities instead of biomass. The maximization
problem in equations (3) and (4) now appears as:
h
xs hs max ,
0
(; ) , (; )
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− ∫ [] ed γτπτ τ τ (5)

















































where  ˙ x ≡ dx/dτ, x0 and y0 are initial conditions on the densities, and:
π(, ) 1






















where x and y are the local densities of fish in the protected and unprotected areas,
respectively. Further, b = (1 – s)K(dr/p) ≡ (1 – s)b0, and f is the transformed logistic
function. x0 = (c/pq)[1/(1 – s)K] is the open-access density level, τ = rt is the time
variable, γ = δ/r is the discount rate, and h = H/[r(1 – s)K] is the harvest rate. Note
that the migration rate, φ, has been replaced with ω = φ/rK combined with a fraction
depending on the degree of protection, s. That is, we need to control for the different
sizes of the areas when we use densities instead of absolute biomass. We will from
now on refer to ω as the normalized rate of migration. The value of the fishery is
now given by (5), and we refer to it as v(x0, y0; s). It relates to the absolute value as
V(X0, Y0; s) = pK·v(x0, y0; s). Thus, the factor pK will cancel from P, such that:
PX Y s
VV X Y s
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vv x y s
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where v0 = v(x0, y0; 0).
The scaling transformation is merely a technical construction, and the structure
of the model is obviously unchanged. The relations and effects stand out more
clearly, however.7 It might seem unnecessary to state the model in both absolute and
relative terms, but the patient reader will discover that both formulations are useful
to us.
The current value Hamiltonian is a useful tool for these kinds of optimization
problems. It is given by:
   [ ( ,,, ,) = ( ,) ( ,,) ( ,) xyhmn xh m xyh n xy πχ ψ + ⋅ + ⋅ , (8)
7 As an example of the more lucid structure, consider the scaling of the discount rate: γ = δ/r, where δ is
the absolute discount rate and r is the intrinsic growth rate in the logistic function. The scaling tells us
that what matters for the optimal solution of the problem is the ratio between interests from alternative
investments and the return from the stock. This is not a particularly deep insight. It is, however, obvious
from the scaling transformation.The Premium of Marine Protected Areas 179
where m and n are the current value multipliers (or shadow values, costates), and χ(x, y,
h) and ψ(x, s) are the right-hand sides of the dynamic conditions in (6), all associated
with the two state variables, x and y, respectively. The first-order conditions for solutions










































where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The first two equations in (9) are
equivalent to the dynamic conditions in (6). Remember that the degree of protection,
s, is only a parameter in this system. When we produce numerical solutions, a new s
poses a new problem, which in turn requires a new optimal solution.
˙ x and  ˙ y are given in (6). For the sake of completeness, we write out the expres-
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Otherwise, we have h = 0. Note that when considering the equilibrium solution; that
is, putting all dot equations in (9) equal to zero,  ˙ y =0 produces the inequality y ≥ x.
The inequality is strict for any practical purposes [x, y ∈ (0,1), 0 < ω < ∞].
Before we move on to the results, there are a few things to be aware of with this
model. The first is a technical issue; the two limits s→1 and s→0. The problem
should be clear from the equations in (2); we end up with zero in the numerators.
Analyzing what happens with the dynamics in these limits is an interesting discus-
sion in itself, but we are not going into it in full detail. First, we are interested in
marine protected areas, which implies s > 0. This makes the zero limit uninteresting.
Notwithstanding, only variables and structures related to the protected area become
‘singular’ in the lower limit, but the area is nonexistent. Thus, our model behaves
nicely in all interesting variables in the limit and is equivalent with the correspond-
ing one-dimensional model. Thus, the one-dimensional model serves as a form of
benchmark for the MPA model. Sandal and Steinshamn (1997, 2001) consider the
corresponding one-dimensional model in more general terms and provide and dis-
cuss feedback solutions; the optimal control depends on the stock level. Feedback
solutions are a powerful tool to deal with uncertainty. “Feedback rules […] repre-Kvamsdal and Sandal 180
sents adaptive management as the control variable changes immediately when new
knowledge about the state variable is available” (Sandal and Steinshamn [2001, p.
420]). In the opposite situation, where we approach full protection (s→1), we expect
the steady-state stock to approach the carrying capacity and harvests to drop to zero.
This is not always true in our model. That said, a sanctuary covering the entire habi-
tat is not interesting in the context of this article. Hence, we will focus on s ∈ (0,1)
and not consider the upper limit.
A weakness in the model (and in the field in general) is the lack of knowledge
and information about the rate of migration. According to McGarvey and Feenstra
(2002), three forms of movement models have been postulated. These are reviewed
in Quinn and Deriso (1999). The diffusion model is one of them (Quinn and Deriso
1999, pp. 402–3). Fournier, Hampton, and Sibert (1998) estimate movement param-
eters in the diffusion sense for South Pacific albacore. Their estimates, translated
into our normalized migration rate, suggest a rate in the area of 0.1 to 0.3. We inves-
tigate a larger range of migration rates. Regarding MPAs, McGarvey (2004)
estimates the migration rate of fish stocks from marine sanctuaries. He is, however,
not using the diffusion model, and his estimate is difficult to compare given our un-
derstanding of the parameter.
We have chosen not to incorporate uncertainty in the model. One motivation for
that is that there is very much uncertainty about the uncertainty itself, the probabil-
ity distribution, the functional form of it, and so on. Additionally, we would be
concerned with uncertainty with regard to several aspects of the model. Adding a
stochastic term, of which we have little empirical knowledge and know little of its
functional form, does not necessarily improve the model. We should develop tools
which are robust to imperfect information about uncertainty (which the information
about uncertainty inherently always is) and, if possible, independent of it.
Nonetheless, a short discussion of the implications of uncertainty follows. Un-
der uncertainty, the value of a fishery is, in general, changed. The question is how
the change is distributed along the protection parameter. A way to look into this
would be to consider single, exogenous shocks to the stock levels, either in both ar-
eas or only in the exploited areas. If the underlying uncertainty was identically
distributed, it would be natural to compare positive and negative shocks in terms of
the value of the fishery. As the market mechanism in our model is linear, that part of
the model would be neutral to identical positive and negative shocks. The optimal
response in harvesting would induce larger changes in harvest upon negative shocks,
due to the general form of the optimal harvesting strategy (an example of the opti-
mal harvest function is given in the appendix; figure A1). Moreover, it is likely that
the stock would ‘recover;’ i.e., return to a steady state faster from a positive shock,
as the growth function usually is steeper to the right of an equilibrium, (because the
equilibrium usually is to the right of the maximal sustainable yield (MSY) stock
level for positive discount rates). That is, negative shocks are more persistent and
have a larger impact on harvest. However, given the complexity of the model, we
would not be surprised if the increase in value from positive shocks dominated the
reduction in value from negative shocks for a limited range of reserve and shock
sizes. This should be investigated further. However, the shocks in stock levels are
probably not identically distributed. As such, one may also investigate the situation
from initial stock levels different from the equilibrium levels and compare effects
from identical shocks under different management regimes (i.e., reserve regimes and
the no reserve regime). Although this seems readily feasible, an entirely new (nu-
merical) analysis is required to address theses issues, as it requires the optimal
harvesting strategy to be recalculated with respect to uncertainty. Particularly, a re-
alistic stochastic process must be formulated and motivated. This must be properly
connected to the migration pattern and all other parts of the biological model.The Premium of Marine Protected Areas 181
Results
Deriving analytic results that are comprehensible and manageable is a difficult and
often impossible task in models like this.8 Instead, we resort to numerical investiga-
tions of the model. In the next section we briefly explain how the numerical
solutions are obtained before we turn to the results. Firstly, we address the premium
and consider different aspects explaining our results. Moreover, we consider differ-
ent biological measures and examine some time-series solutions.
The Numerical Analysis
We use optimal control theory to produce the optimal management strategy. Since
the problem is autonomous, we are able to produce feedback solutions, solutions
only dependent on state variables; i.e., the densities, and thus are independent of
time. In particular, we use dynamic programming. The maximization problem is for-
mulated in continuous time, with continuous state variables. We follow the
discretization process in Grüne and Semmler (2004) to make state and time vari-
ables discrete and to form the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for our problem.
However, our approach is a slight variation to Grüne and Semmler (2004) when it
comes to the maximization procedure, as we assume the control variable; i.e., the
harvest rate, to take values in the continuum [0, ∞). (Grüne and Semmler (2004) as-
sert that the control variable takes values in a predetermined fixed set of discrete
values.) This is possible because the control variable enters in the profit function (7)
to the second degree. We are thus able to identify a unique control which maximizes
π. The method implies computing a fix point of a dynamic programming operator.
More technical details are found in the appendix.
The parameter values listed in table 1 are based on data presented by Kugarajh,
Sandal, and Berge (2006). Two relevant parameters are not present in the table: ω
and s. As mentioned, little data exist on the migration parameter, ω. We will focus
on a range of values, exploring the effects from various levels of migration.
The price parameter, p, and the carrying capacity, K, are only relevant in the
link between the relative and absolute formulation of the premium. Appropriate di-
mensions are given in the table. The other parameters are dimensionless, as are the
variables of the transformed maximization problem.
8 For example, the analytical expression for the equilibrium solution of one of the variables fills several




γ 0.1 Relative discount rate
x0 0.15 Open-access density
b0 1.5 Relative demand parameter
p 10 Price parameter (NOK per kilogram)
K 6,000 Carrying capacity (1,000 kilograms)Kvamsdal and Sandal 182
The Premium of Marine Protected Areas
Figure 1 shows the result from numerical calculations of the premium of an MPA as
a function of s for four different values of the normalized migration rate. There are
three important things to observe in this figure: (i) the premium is positive and in-
creasing with s; (ii) increasing the normalized migration rate reduces the premium;
and (iii) the premium is smaller than s, which is the same as saying that you have to
give up less in profit than what you protect in habitat, P(s) < s. The first observation
(i) is a consequence of the fact that the model is deterministic and nonlinear and that
we optimize returns in the unprotected area. The second observation (ii) gives us
reason to comprehend the normalized migration rate as a degree of exploitation of
the stock in the reserve. The higher the rates, the less profits decline and, as we will
see in a moment, harvest is reduced by a smaller amount. The last observation (iii)
results from several mechanisms, but the driving force behind all of them is the fact
that density levels change. Changing densities influence profits directly through the
stock effect and indirectly through the market effect; demand is elastic and prices
change when harvests change. Harvests change due to changes in production.
Changes in production relate directly to the changing stock densities. Migration,
which in this context can be perceived as a part of the production system, also
Figure 1.  The MPA Premium as a Function of the Degree of Protection, P(s)
Notes: Parameters are given in table 1. The different curves correspond to different values for the
normalized migration rate, ω.The Premium of Marine Protected Areas 183
changes due to changing densities. We shall investigate all of these mechanisms
later, but before that, one more observation is necessary in figure 1.
Note that the premium curves are convex. Since the curves are increasing, con-
vexity means that protecting one extra unit of habitat is more costly than the last
unit. For example, by trying to make a protectionist twice as happy by doubling the
size of the reserve, it more than doubles the difficulty for the commercial agents in
the fishery. This presumably complicates, e.g., the process of deciding on the degree
of protection. However, convex costs are in agreement with fundamental economic
assertions and usually make it easier to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of an
internal solution in economic problems.9 We observe convexity also with a zero mi-
gration rate. This is analytically feasible and is carried out in the appendix. The
analytical results improve our confidence in the generality of the convexity property.
Further, it suggests that the convex property stems from the nonlinearities in the
profit function; i.e., the market effect and the stock effect.
In figure 2(a), we compare the premium from the equilibrium solution in figure
1 with the premium arising from the dynamic solution for two different initial den-
sity levels (0.1 and 1). (Please note that we compare different situations: one where
the density is uniform at time zero; that is, when the reserve is established; and one
where the initial density distribution matches the equilibrium distribution. In the
former situation, the system evolves and presumably converges towards the equilib-
rium; i.e., a dynamic situation. The latter situation is static. Such ‘static’ initial
conditions are by all practical means impossible. Still, the results indicate that the
comparison is justifiable.) Notice that the equilibrium curve, which is based on the
assumption that the equilibrium density is the initial density, is found between the
curves of the dynamic solutions. This happens as the initial densities are lower (or
higher) than the equilibrium density for all degrees of protection. That is, the larger
the stock when the MPA is established, the cheaper it becomes. However, we also
observe that the gap between the two dynamic solutions is rather small. This indi-
cates that the initial size of the stock is not very important for the premium of an
MPA. Remember that our definition of the premium is a relative measure and that
the absolute premium related to highly profitable stock levels is much higher than
that of small stock levels, which are less profitable. Still, our results suggest that us-
ing equilibrium solutions when calculating the MPA premium is a good
approximation, and its simplicity outweighs the error of doing so. Taking into con-
sideration that many of the input parameters are only roughly known, the
importance of this simplification is further diminished. We will use this approximat-
ing approach for the rest of the article (that is, only considering steady-state values
of the variables), except when dealing with time-series solutions. For the sake of
completeness, the appendix provides an example of a feedback harvest rule and the
corresponding value function for our problem (figure A1). However, the results in
figure 2(a) depend on the rate of discounting. We use a rate of 5% in the calculations
reported throughout the article. The equilibrium solution is representative for the
dynamic solutions to a decreasing degree for an increasing rate of discounting. Still,
after investigating the results for a range of discount rates (figures 2[b]-[d]), we feel
confident that our equilibrium analysis gives a good estimation of how these are
connected, at least for rates up to 20%.
We shall now investigate the mechanisms behind observation (iii) in figure 1,
P(s) < s. As already stated, the driving force behind the different effects is the
changing density levels as the degree of protection changes. Remember that we are
considering the equilibrium solution, so what really happens is that there are differ-
9 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this insight.Kvamsdal and Sandal 184
Figure 2.  Comparing the Static (equilibrium, x*) and Dynamic Solutions of the
Premium for Two Different Initial Density Conditions: x(t = 0; s) = 0.1, and x(t = 0; s) = 1
Notes: The four panels correspond to four different rates of discounting: (a) 5%, (b) 10%, (c) 20%, and
(d) 50%. These are all per annum rates. Other parameters are given in table 1. The normalized migration
rate is held fixed at ω = 0.1.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
ent optimal equilibrium positions for different protection levels. Equilibrium density
levels and the harvest rate as functions of the degree of protection are displayed in
figure 3(a). We observe that the density in the protected area is increasing while de-
creasing in the rest of the habitat. The increase in density in the protected area
reduces production in that area; it moves away from the level of MSY, which is ex-
actly one half.10 Production increases in the remaining grounds as long as the
10 The absolute production may well be rising. As the area size is rising, the actual biomass in it in-
creases faster when both the size and the density are rising. However, we are interested in the densities
and how efficient production is. When the density level moves away from the MSY level, production is
less efficient, or a smaller part of the potential for natural growth is realized.The Premium of Marine Protected Areas 185
density is above the MSY level, approaching it as the density is decreasing. As the
density falls beyond the MSY level, production decreases also in the unprotected
area. In absolute terms, the aggregated production is declining as s is increasing in
the entire interval. The falling density in the unprotected area also implies that har-
vesting costs are increasing. The decline in harvest (figure 3[a]), which is in
accordance with the findings of Guénette and Pitcher (1999), induces a higher mar-
ket value of a unit of fish due to the demand mechanism.11 It turns out that the
optimal harvesting strategy is to put stronger pressure on the unprotected stock and
reduce the density. The gain in the unit price of fish is larger than the increase in the
unit harvesting cost. Thus, for a small agent in the fishery with an individual, fixed
quota, the fishery becomes more profitable. Note that the property y > x is satisfied.
We have identified three mechanisms that have influence on the value of the
fishery: rising costs from declining density (stock effect), decline in harvest (which
we coin the protection effect), and rising prices (market effect). The first two of
these have negative impact on returns; the latter has a positive effect. As already es-
tablished, the negative effects outweigh the positive effect with increasing strength
along s and decreasing strength along ω. We will return to the interplay between the
stock effect and the market effect when we turn to time-series solutions.
Related shadow values (refer to equation [8]) are found in figure 3(b). The
shadow values are interpreted as the marginal value of the associated state variables.
In the case of a fish stock, it measures the value of fish left unharvested, or rather,
the value of an additional unit of fish in the sea. Not surprisingly, the value of that
extra unit of unprotected fish increases as more of the habitat is protected. As the
degree of protection increases, the supply of the resource is reduced. As already
11 Note that the scaling of the harvest variable depends on the degree of protection. The scaling transfor-
mation is singular in s → 1, however. We control for the dependence on s in the reported results, which
then are easier to interpret.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.  (a) Density Levels, x and y, and Harvest Rate, h, as Functions
of the Degree of Protection; (b) Corresponding Shadow Values for
the Stock Levels in (a); m Corresponds to x, n Corresponds to y
Notes: The normalized migration rate is ω = 0.1. Other parameters are given in table 1.Kvamsdal and Sandal 186
seen, the density in the unprotected area is decreasing. The shadow value of the pro-
tected stock displays some interesting behavior. For small reserves the shadow value
is falling, and for large reserves it is rising. The increase for large s is hardly visible
in the figure. The effect is more pronounced for smaller levels of b; that is, a weaker
market effect. An additional unit of protected fish has two consequences: production
decreases in the protected area since the stock level moves further away from the
MSY stock level, and migration increases since the difference in density increases.
By studying the shadow price we increase our understanding of the changing densi-
ties, and thus the mechanisms behind the premium curves in figure 1. As observed in
figure 3(a), the stock increases rapidly for small reserves and slower for large re-
serves. A possible explanation for the behavior of the shadow value for the protected
stock may be that the negative impact on production is stronger than the positive im-
pact on migration for small s, and vice versa for large s.
Biological Measures
To increase the understanding of the model dynamics, we construct and compute the
effect on relative growth (ERG) for the two areas, which tells us how much of the
potential production is reached in each area. This is a very common measure (some-
times even subject to maximization), particularly in purely biologically oriented
papers (e.g., Guénette and Pitcher 1999). We use MSY as a benchmark, hence we
have ERG(·) = 1 when MSY is attained. Note that we consider densities and conse-
quently the growth function is f(x) = x(1 – x). We have xMSY = 1/2 ⇒ f(xMSY) = 1/4.
The absolute migration between the areas is also calculated. The results are found in
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where x is the density in the unprotected area. ERG(y) is defined similarly for the
reserve; the argument indicates which area is addressed. The absolute growth de-
pends on the actual size of the areas. Observe that even though the density level in the
protected area is moving away from the MSY level (figure 3); that is, growth is decreas-
ing, migration is increasing for all s (figure 4[b]). The gap between the densities
increases (figure 3). The production in the reserve must equal the migration, hence the
absolute production is increasing. Nevertheless, it becomes less efficient. Moreover, the
results in figure 4(b) suggest that the migration is increasing in the migration rate.12
It is also interesting that the ERG(x) is more or less unchanged for different migra-
tion rates, while ERG(y) changes considerably. Looking further into this, figures
4(c) and 4(d) compare migration with the natural growth in the two areas. That is:
φ()






for the open area and correspondingly for the protected area. We find that the rela-
tionship responds heavily to changes in the migration rate when it comes to the open
12 The analysis regards the normalized rate of migration. However, as the normalization is linear in the
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area (figure 4[c]); production remains more or less the same while the migration
changes. As established from the dynamic constraints, there is a one-to-one relation-
ship between migration and production in the protected area (figure 4[d]).
We study two more biological measures. The first is the relative increase in
standing stock (ISS) from establishing an MPA. Hannesson (1998) coins this mea-
sure the conservation effect. The increase in stock is an increase in biological
capital; a biological gain. Note that, particularly in terms of production, an increase
in stock is not always positive. However, when there is no upper limit on harvesting
Figure 4.  (a) The Effect on Relative Growth (ERG) in the Two Areas as
Functions of s, Displayed for Three Different Normalized Rates of Migration;
(b) Measuring the Absolute Migration between the Two Areas, given by
 φ(y – x); (c) Migration Relative to the Natural Growth in the Unprotected
Area; (d) Migration Relative to the Natural Growth in the Protected Area
Note: Parameters for all four panels are found in table 1.
(a) (b)
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capacity, an increase in stock represents an increase in value of the fishery for any
relevant stock-level. This is exemplified in figure A1(b). For the ISS measure, we
need to consider the absolute values. We have X(s) + Y(s) – X(0), where X(s) and
Y(s) are the absolute standing stock levels for different degrees of protection, and
X(0) is the standing stock level for the no protection case. However, absolute terms
are a bit awkward, and by dividing through by X(0), we transform the measure into a










The measure compares the size of the equilibrium standing stock under the two dif-
ferent strategies: reserve and no reserve. It turns out that the shape of these curves is
similar to the shape of the premium curves (figure 1). Thus, we find it natural to
compare these; that is, in figure 5 we consider the relationship ISS(s)/P(s). This rela-
tionship compares the relative increase in biomass (capital) with the relative loss in
Figure 5.  The Relative Increase in Standing Stock, ISS(s), Compared to the Premium
of MPAs, ISS(s)/P(s), for Different Values of the Normalized Migration Rate
Note: Parameters for the calculations are found in table 1.The Premium of Marine Protected Areas 189
13 Moreover, the results imply that the premium declines faster than the increase in stock with the migra-
tion rate. The slope of the curves in figure 5 is determined by the relationship between the slopes of
ISS(s) and P(s). For small s, the premium curve has the steeper slope and vice versa for large s.
Figure 6.  The Relative Increase in Standing Stock, ISS(s), for Four
Different Values of the Normalized Migration Rate
Note: Further parameters are found in table 1.
total profit. Figure 5 shows the results for a range of different values for the normal-
ized migration rate. In order to provide a complete analysis, some of the
corresponding curves for ISS(s) are presented in figure 6.
The evidence from figure 5 is that the premium dominates the increase in stand-
ing stock {[ISS(s)/P(s)] < 1} for all degrees of protection and for most rates of
migration. A higher normalized migration rate dilutes the conservation effect. This is
an important mechanism behind the reduction in the premium from increasing the
rate of migration.13
While ISS(s) measures how much the MPA strategy increases the standing stock,
the measure we construct next concerns the share of the standing stock that is pro-
tected. From the property y > x we know that the density is higher in the reserve,
thus the protected share of the total stock is larger than the protected share of habi-Kvamsdal and Sandal 190
tat, s. What we want to know is exactly how much more than s of the biomass is
found under protection. At least s of the biomass is found under protection with cer-
tainty for any nonnegative migration rate. We can perceive this as a measure of how
effective the MPA is to protect the stock. We name this measure the protected stand-










Figure 7 displays PSS(s) for different values of the normalized migration rate. It
must be zero in s = 0 and s = 1 and positive for all other s ∈ (0,1), given that the rate
of migration is positive and finite. This follows from the equilibrium property y > x.
PSS(s) decreases with the migration rate. This is in accordance with Guénette and
Pitcher (1999), inter alios. This is also in accordance with our earlier results. A high
rate of migration reduces the conservation effect, and as the migration rate goes to
Figure 7.  Protected Standing Stock, PSS(s), for Different
Values of the Normalized Migration Rate
Note: Other parameter values are found in table 1.The Premium of Marine Protected Areas 191
infinity, the density approaches a uniform distribution: limφ→∞ PSS(s) = 0. The ex-
pression in (10) arises from comparing the natural growth, or production, when s = 0
and s > 0. The comparison suggests that whenever s equals the share of the stock
found in the protected area; i.e., that the density is uniform in the entire habitat (x = y),
the growth in both cases is equal. This is straightforward as the growth is density
dependent. Different values of s yield a smaller total growth. The foregone produc-
tion is a consequence of the convexity of the logistic function and the dispersed
densities (refer to the earlier discussion of difference in growth). PSS(s) assess the
displacement between the best possible dispersion when it comes to total, natural
growth (uniform dispersion) and the equilibrium dispersion. Thus, we can compre-
hend PSS(s)  as a measure of inefficiency in the natural production. The analytical
comparison of the two cases and the derivation of (10) are found in the appendix.
Time-Series Solutions
Until now, we have studied the equilibrium solution of the problem. We will finally
turn to the dynamic solutions. We present a comparison of two time-series solutions:
one with and one without an MPA. Or rather, we compare the solution of the corre-
sponding one-dimensional model with the solution of the MPA model. We
investigate the density distribution, harvest rate, and real unit price of fish as func-
tions of time. The MPA covers half the habitat of the fish stock. Figure 8(a) shows
density paths where the initial stock level is only 10% of the total carrying capacity.
The fish are uniformly dispersed in the two areas at time zero; the densities in the
two areas are equal. The figure also displays the average fish density in the MPA
case, and the curve is thus comparable to the one-dimensional case. Corresponding
catch rates are found in figure 8(b). We observe that the average density is always
higher with the reserve; consequently, the total standing stock is larger in the MPA
situation. Further, the density in the unprotected area is smaller than the density in
the no reserve case; the stock effect induces higher harvesting costs with the reserve
implemented. The catch rate is always higher without the reserve. Further, the sys-
tem approaches equilibrium slower when there is no reserve. There is a ‘moratorium’ in
the initial period until the stock has been rebuilt to levels above the open-access level.
The ‘moratorium’ is lifted earlier in the no-MPA case. The two systems (MPA and no
MPA) follow the same path as long as harvest is zero; that is, as long as the density is
uniformly dispersed. In figure 8(b) the real unit price of fish is calculated. Notably, the
price is always higher in the reserve case. We have two effects in play here: changes in
harvest level change the price of fish in the market, and changing densities influence
costs related to catching. A higher real price in the MPA case implies that the market
effect outruns the stock effect, and the net return per unit of fish increases with the
reserve in place. There is typically room for fewer active agents in the fishery, how-
ever, as the total catch is smaller. These results depends on the relationship between
the price parameter, p, and the demand parameter, d. Certainly, parameters exist (al-
though more obscure) such that the conclusion is reversed; a weaker market effect
compared to the stock effect, and the fishery becomes less profitable for the agents
as a consequence of the establishment of a marine reserve.
Conclusions
Hannesson (2002) is skeptical to advocate marine protected areas as a bet hedging
tool, and Sanchirico (2000) dismisses the use of the term insurance related to re-
serves. However, there is a wide consensus that MPAs have the potential to reduceKvamsdal and Sandal 192
uncertainties in several aspects of a fishery. To be able to evaluate the usefulness of
MPAs, thorough analyses of economic and biological effects are required, particu-
larly when such instruments are implemented. Grafton, Kompass, and Schneider
(2005, p. 173) name the “small number of studies that combine both the biological
and economic drivers of marine reserves” as one of the main barriers in better utili-
zation of reserves. In this article, we have gone to new depths in analyzing the cost
incurred from establishing a protected area in a bioeconomic model. Particularly, the
implementation of a two-dimensional optimal harvest rule is a new contribution. We
reveal and discuss how costs are generated and study the different mechanisms that
work on both economic and biological factors. Different biological measures are
proposed and investigated.
The main finding is that costs are smaller than the share of protected habitat
compared to the total profits, and that protecting one more unit is more costly than
the last unit protected; i.e., convexity. Convex costs agree with standard economic
assertions and increase confidence in the results. However, the lack of knowledge on
the migration term is a problem. The optimization indicates that the harvest rate
should increase in the remaining area open to fishing as the degree of protection in-
creases. That is, the larger the protected are is, the more one wants to stimulate
migration through a large density gap. The results are based on numerical calcula-
tions, and the generality depends on the choice of parameter values. However, the
model displays mostly monotonic behavior when we alter the different parameters
for large intervals around the investigated parameters. This leads us to believe that
our findings apply more generally. In particular, the convex property is well docu-
mented, as it is shown analytically for the zero migration case.
We have investigated different biological measures. We find that a reserve leads
Figure 8.  (a) Densities as Functions of Time, t. Two Protection Scenarios
are Compared: s = 0.5 and s = 0. The Aggregate Density is given by
(1 – s)x + sy in the Reserve Scenario (solid line). Local Densities in
the First Scenario are also Reported. (b) Comparing the Harvest
Rate and the Real Unit Price of Fish in the Same Two Scenarios
Notes: The normalized migration rate is set to ω = 0.1 in both panels, time is given in years, and further
parameter values are found in table 1.
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to less efficient biological production. Results suggest that the rate of migration is
an important determining factor when comparing the relative increase in the stand-
ing stock with the premium of the MPA. Further, the share of stock found in the
reserve compared to that of protected habitat is investigated. This measure could be
understood as the marginal biological value of the protection; it demonstrates the in-
crease in protected biomass relative to the degree of protection.
Our analysis also shows that the fishery potentially becomes more profitable to
individual agents (remaining active) because the real unit price of fish goes up.
However, this effect is critically dependent on the chosen parameters.
Finally, we think there is room for improvement and further investigation within
this framework. In particular, we would like to see the results from introducing a
stochastic element in the model. Studying more sophisticated biological and eco-
nomic submodels will potentially provide additional insights.
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Appendix
Comparing Growth Models
In absolute terms, the total natural growth in the entire area in the MPA model less
the total natural growth in the corresponding one dimensional model is given by:
FX sK FYs K FX YK (; ( 1 )) (; ) ( ; ) − + − +
=1
(1 )





























This expression should be equal to zero if there is no difference in the two growth mod-




















which shows that the growth is equal in the two models when the fraction of bio-
mass in the two areas is proportional to the fraction of habitat under protection.
Whenever that is the case, the density is uniform in the entire habitat; i.e., the situa-
tion is identical in the two different models. Equal growth would then be
anticipated. The expression for s0 appears in (10).
Further, s0 being a double root implies that the expression in (A-1) is either
positive or negative for all s ≠ s0. It is readily seen that the expression is negative.
Hence:
FX sK FYs K FX YK (; ( 1 )) (; ) ( ; ) − + ≤ + .
The natural growth in the corresponding one-dimensional model is always bigger or
equal to the total natural growth in the MPA model.
Details on the Numerical Solution Scheme




















⎥ max , (A-2)
where x is the discrete state variable; h is the control variable; Δτ is the discrete
time step; vΔτ(x) is the value function with respect to the time step and discrete state
variable; and β = 1 – Δτ ·γ, the discrete discount rate. The discrete variables, timeKvamsdal and Sandal 196
step, and discount rate are formulated in accordance with the discretization proce-
dure given in Grüne and Semmler (2004). Note that we have omitted the s-parameter
in the value function. To maximize our problem (5, 6), we approximate a solution to
the fixed point equation:
vT v ΔΔ Δ ττ τ ( ) = [ ]( ) xx .
Solutions are produced from an iterative process (Bertsekas 2005; Grüne and
Semmler 2004). The numerical solutions are approximations, as we end the iterative
process when an error measure satisfies a predetermined condition.
Convexity of Premium in the Zero Migration Rate Case
From equation (1) we see that the premium being convex in s is equivalent to V(X0,
Y0; s) being concave in s. When the migration rate is set to zero, the system degener-
ates to a one-dimensional system where the carrying capacity is reduced along s.
However, as the profit function is concave in all variables, and all meaningful vari-
ables in the degenerate problem [i.e., X(s), H(s)] are decreasing monotonically in s,
it is easily seen that V(·;s) = Π(·)/δ implies concavity in V(·;s) and thus convexity in
P(·;s).
Additional Figures
Figure A1(a) displays an example of an optimal feedback harvesting rule. The corre-
sponding value function is presented in figure A1(b). The value function yields the
value of the fishery for given initial densities.The Premium of Marine Protected Areas 197
Figure A1.  (a) Optimal Feedback Harvesting Rule as a Function of Local Densities;
(b) the Value Function Corresponding to the Given Harvest Rule
Notes: The normalized migration rate is set to ω = 0.1 in both panels, and s = 0.5. Further parameter
values are found in table 1.
(a)
(b)